A week ago, we published an article in which we proposed a tactical-level complement to the Army’s operating concept, multidomain operations. We called it reconnaissance-strike battle, and argued that it would provide clarity to tactical leaders on objectives and transformation priorities, as well as a framework to organize their combat power for success on the modern battlefield. It rests on four core imperatives:

  1. Be a hard target first.
  2. The reconnaissance-strike complex is the first objective.
  3. The side that owns the reconnaissance-strike complex duel wins.
  4. Massing capability must come before massing maneuver.

However, changing doctrine is not enough. Fighting reconnaissance-strike battle necessitates change at the pace of war. Specifically, there is a vital need for fundamental and concrete adjustments to the way the US Army mans, trains, and equips in order to implement reconnaissance-strike battle. Fortunately, these changes would also support the intent already described by Army senior leaders as the basis for the Army’s transformation initiative, including transformation in contact.

Manning for Reconnaissance-Strike Battle

Reconnaissance-strike battle’s emphasis on reconnaissance-strike complexes as the first objective provides clear priorities for tactical leaders in developing organizations and capabilities for modern war. As Brett Friedman notes in a 2024 Journal of Advanced Military Studies article, “Older tactics and the traditional platforms of the armor-infiltration regime are not obsolete, but the reconnaissance-strike regime offers additional tactical possibilities that effective military forces will exploit. . . . Services must design their forces for the tactical regime they are in.”

With this imperative in mind, the US Army should reconsider its deactivation of cavalry squadrons inside its infantry divisions. While handcuffed by congressional force caps, transformation in contact provides the Army an opportunity to repurpose cavalry squadron manpower and skillsets for reconnaissance-strike squadrons in each infantry brigade, capable of deploying tactical reconnaissance-strike complexes at scale. These squadrons would address several key requirements imposed by the conditions of the modern battlefield.

First, reconnaissance-strike battle is underpinned by mature reconnaissance-strike complexes at echelon. As researchers at the Royal United Services Institute described in a study on using drones to enable mass precision strike, these complexes require not only physical platforms, but also “launch crews, command links, planning tools, intelligence support and design teams” to enable a system that “offers a commander the ability to deliver mass precision effects.” This requires a dedicated formation that can focus on this effort, mature it rapidly, train it deeply, and rehearse it as an integral part of every combined arms operation.

Second, as the mass precision strike report assessed, an effective tactical reconnaissance-strike complex needs a unit of action that can generate twenty-four strike drones simultaneously. Using average tactical drone sizes, the report continued, a mixed group of six drones could be employed from a single tactical utility vehicle and four such vehicles, each with three crewmembers—a driver, a communicator, and an operator (we suggest adding a munitions engineer to bring the crew to four)—could make up a platoon. Operating in two-vehicle sections would enable offset launch and recovery, offset antennae for communications, and multivector attacks. Three platoons in a reconnaissance-strike troop would then provide necessary redundancy for repeat attacks and the independence and modularity necessary to support a maneuver unit.

Finally, the report’s authors conclude, the need for deep intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) requires three drones to maintain a single orbit—one in flight, one being recovered, and one being prepared for launch. Given current tactical fixed-wing ISR drone sizes, three platforms, along with necessary command-and-control equipment, could be carried in two vehicles. The authors recommend a crew of three per vehicle—a mechanic who drives the vehicle, along with a communicator and sensor operator and a pilot (here, too, we recommend an additional crewmember, in this case a navigator). Six vehicle pairs would then allow a deep reconnaissance troop to generate three sustained orbits—or, when ISR capability must be surged, six simultaneous orbits during twenty-four crew operations—for the reconnaissance-strike squadron.

Recent organizational evolution in the Army has been a step in the right direction, particularly the establishment of multifunctional reconnaissance companies. But it is not enough. The success of these new companies—employed by 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Infantry Division and 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division during combat training center rotations—is providing a false sense of security. Their dominant focus on reconnaissance (with no organic drone strike capability), primarily infantry-centric role, and limited assets—as well as the limited opposition they faced at combat training centers from electromagnetic interference or a robust enemy tactical reconnaissance-strike complex—combine to invite false conclusions about the scope of further change required. In its war against Russia, Ukraine employs multiple drone battalions, some specially focused on long-range strikes, while also using assault drone companies that are a part of almost every fighting brigade. Personnel in these units undergo substantial training—one Ukrainian soldier said that seventy hours in a simulator and another seventy flying an actual drone are required. Moreover, these units are further supported by brigade-level drone workshops. In contrast, the multifunctional reconnaissance companies combine many of the right capabilities, but not in the quantity, or with the dedicated mission, to enable success in a tactical reconnaissance-strike complex duel. They also lack the structure to invest in training the large numbers of quality drone pilots that Ukraine’s experience and independent think tank analysis both suggest are necessary.

Ultimately, the US Army has demonstrated unprecedented organizational flexibility by embracing its transformation in contact initiative. It provides an in-stride method of adopting organizational change that could, for example, immediately apply an emerging reconnaissance-strike battle concept to create reconnaissance-strike squadrons out of existing reconnaissance and security formations—formations that are purpose-built to adapt to, and own, this dedicated mission set. As shown in Ukraine and the 2020 Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, continuing to build massed combat power capability in infantry and armor formations without the requisite support of a robust tactical reconnaissance-strike complex invites their destruction before they can be employed to effect.

Training for Reconnaissance-Strike Battle

Reconnaissance-strike battle is easy to visualize, naturally calling to mind the necessary components of reconnaissance, fires, and maneuver that leaders need to sequence. Its focus on reconnaissance-strike tactics enables leaders to control the tempo of an engagement, isolate, suppress, and maneuver on the enemy, and win. But to employ it, units must be able to train on it. This requires two overarching things. First, Training and Doctrine Command should work with US Army Installation Management Command, US Army Forces Command, and the Federal Aviation Administration to unburden brigades and divisions by providing on-call or persistent airspace over every maneuver brigade footprint and all training areas. Units are currently limited across their installations, and exceptions to policy have to be championed from the brigade level. Reconnaissance-strike battle requires a whole-of-Army approach to enable these units to freely train drone operators, both at their operating facilities and in every field training exercise.

Second, combat training centers need to provide an opposing force equipped with a tactical reconnaissance-strike complex to teach maneuver brigades how to fight reconnaissance-strike battle. Army and Marine authors have both highlighted the need to adopt a new offensive paradigm acknowledging the reconnaissance-strike regime. Combat training centers are the premier training ground for Army tactical units. The Army needs to resource and train them to provide a modern tactical reconnaissance-strike complex for the opposing force that generates lessons learned from catastrophic failure and develops the tactics required to win against our modernizing adversaries. Maneuver is not dead; we just need a tactical-reconnaissance-strike complex to enable it.

Fundamentally, training for reconnaissance-strike battle should be guided by a simple adage: Train what kills. Units need large-scale, protected, and continuous training for a dedicated force in reconnaissance-strike drone tactics and operations. This should include training expertise in:

  • Small drone ISR operations, including finding, fixing, tracking, and targeting at scale, inclusive of targeting data relay through the kill chain.
  • Small drone dropper/bomber precision-strike operations against tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, utility vehicles, artillery, other equipment, and personnel from one hundred meters of altitude.
  • Remote, first-person-view (FPV) precision-strike operations against tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, utility vehicles, artillery, other equipment, personnel, and other drones.
  • Wire-guided FPV precision-strike operations against tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, utility vehicles, artillery, other equipment, and personnel.
  • Medium and heavy dropper/bomber precision-strike operations against logistics targets, other equipment, and personnel from one hundred meters of altitude.
  • Fixed-wing ISR operations, including finding, fixing, tracking, and targeting at scale, inclusive of data relay through the kill chain.
  • Employment of loitering munitions for precision-strike operations against antiaccess and area-denial capabilities, artillery, tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, utility vehicles, and other equipment.
  • The use of decoy drones to support and enable attack drones to reach their targets.
  • The use of electronic warfare and cyber tools to find enemy drone operators and their command-and-control equipment for drone-based precision strikes that save artillery shells.
  • The use of electronic warfare and cyber tools to neutralize enemy drones and air defense capabilities.
  • The use of radar to provide altitude data in support of FPV operations to counter enemy drone threats.
  • The use of protective cages to protect equipment from FPV strikes.
  • Digging in, dispersion, deception, and disguise, because survivability is lethality.
  • The deployment of resilient mobile networks including low-visibility satellite terminals, mobile cell towers, and mesh networks to directly link sensors and shooters for rapid closing of kill chains.

Equipping for Reconnaissance-Strike Battle

The US Army needs more quantity, more diversity, faster acquisition, and fewer constraints in building its tactical reconnaissance-strike complex capabilities. Chief among the Army’s needs are two things. First, the service must have many more drones, of many types. It needs to further accelerate drone purchases and reduce bureaucratic barriers to unit purchases, enabling tactical units to build the constellation of drones, at scale, required for modern warfare. The Royal United Services Institute report discussed above recommends five UAV classes:

  • Situational awareness platforms optimized for tactical reconnaissance
  • Tactical strike drones
  • ISR drones able to penetrate into operational depth
  • Operational strike drones
  • Platform-launched effects designed specifically to synchronize with and enable other weapons systems

Separately, a comprehensive report published last year by CNAS regarding drones in a Taiwan scenario recommends “a diverse fleet of aerial drones that includes a mix of higher-end and cheaper systems.” Along with acquiring good enough long-range drones for target acquisition and strikes, the United States should maintain a smaller fleet of stealthy drones capable of conducting surveillance in contested airspace and providing targeting data for standoff missile attacks. Finally, current information from Ukraine identifies the need for:

Beyond these categories of drones, several other imperatives stand out. First, current US drones are too expensive to use at scale, fail to operate in the dense electromagnetic noise, and rely too much on GPS. The Army should look to non-US drones until these shortcomings are improved. Second, sufficient magazine depth is vital. Every month, Ukraine is losing ten to twenty thousand drones, necessitating $60 million per month for drone purchases by its frontline brigades. In contrast, the US Army has provided 360 drones to its three transformation in contact brigades, while promising “thousands” more, a fraction of the operational need. Third, the Army needs virtual training capability. The immediate purchase of virtual reality goggles built to train drone pilots will enable tactical units to train operators faster, without airspace limitation, and with less risk to equipment. Fourth, and most fundamentally, speed is essential. While the current transformation in contact and Replicator initiatives are a leap ahead, the US Army needs to move even faster to establish the production, acquisition, and maintenance necessary to support the employment and reconstitution of drones required for reconnaissance-strike battle.

And, of course, along with this diverse array of platforms, networks to facilitate the rapid acquisition, analysis, dissemination, and exploitation of information are an operational necessity. The US Army’s integrated tactical network is already driving toward the connectivity required to support disaggregated kill chains. However, current lessons provide additional emphasis on capabilities required to excel in reconnaissance-strike battle: Drones need to link directly to artillery units. ISR drones need to feed directly to strike drones. Drones must tie directly into software-based battle networks. Soldiers on the front line must have access to targeting data. And networks need to be unburdened from overclassification to allow networked precision strike at the tactical edge.

Two things can be true at the same time. It is an undeniable fact that the US Army is applying resources, identifying lessons learned, and devoting leadership attention to adapt faster than ever before using transformation in contact. Yet, equally true, that is still not enough. As the war in Ukraine speeds the reconnaissance-strike regime ahead of its maneuver-infiltration counterpart, the US Army cannot afford half measures. It needs to field new organizations, tactics, and equipment, at scale, to win on the modern battlefield. Separate from the decision to make reconnaissance-strike battle the tactical complement to multidomain operations, the Army can, and should, use the transformation in contact framework to apply the recommendations described above to meet clear and urgent operational needs. But adopting reconnaissance-strike battle provides the doctrinal impetus to do so.

Major Zackery Spear is an infantry officer currently serving in a joint assignment at US Indo-Pacific Command. He has deployed with the 75th Ranger Regiment in support of operations in Afghanistan and previously served as the brigade operations officer for 2nd Mobile Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, planning for and initiating the brigade’s transformation in contact.

Lieutenant Colonel Michael Culler is an armor officer currently serving in a joint assignment at US Indo-Pacific Command. He has previously served in the 25th Infantry Division as the 3rd Brigade Combat Team executive officer and at the National Training Center as an OC/T and rotational planner. He has been deployed to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, USINDOPACOM, or the Department of Defense.

Image credit: Elena Baladelli, US Army